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Abstract ― We examine in an experiment the causes, consequences and possible 
cures of myopic loss aversion (MLA) for investment behaviour under risk. We find 
that both, investment horizons and feedback frequency contribute almost equally to 
the effects of MLA. Longer investment horizons and less frequent feedback lead to 
higher investments. However, when given the choice, subjects prefer on average 
shorter investment horizons and more frequent feedback. Exploiting the status quo 
bias by setting a long investment horizon or low feedback frequency as a default 
turns out to be a successful behavioural intervention that increases investment 
levels. 
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1. Introduction 
The concept of myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been introduced by Benartzi and 
Thaler (1995) to explain the puzzling evidence that stock markets offer an abnormally 
high equity premium, which is known as the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and 
Prescott, 1985). MLA basically constitutes a behavioural combination of loss aversion 
(see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and mental 
accounting (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1985). In the context of financial 
decision making, loss aversion implies that individuals’ disutility from suffering a loss 
is in absolute terms higher than the utility from receiving an equally high gain, and 
mental accounting means that long term investments are evaluated according to their 
short term returns. Assuming that investors suffer from MLA, an abnormally high 
equity premium can be rationalized in that stocks are relatively unattractive for 
investors because stock prices fluctuate and generate not only frequent gains, but also 
losses. Based on simulations of real financial markets data, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) 
have argued that the size of the equity premium is consistent with investors who weigh 
losses two times larger than gains and evaluate their portfolios on an annual basis. 
In this paper, we focus on two research questions related to MLA. First, we 
examine whether the influence of MLA on investment decisions is rather driven by the 
frequency of feedback on the performance or by the time horizon of an investment. If 
information feedback is the driving force subjects should be backward-looking and 
more likely base their investments on previous returns. If the time horizon of an 
investment – i.e. the flexibility in changing one’s investment levels – is the important 
source of MLA, subjects will rather be forward-looking, and therefore probably less 
affected by past returns. We show in an experiment that both the length of the 
investment horizon and the feedback frequency have a significant effect on investment 
levels. Given this finding, we address, second, how MLA can be contained or 
attenuated. This issue has not been addressed in the literature on MLA so far, but it 
seems highly relevant for the design and regulation of real-world investments in risky 
assets. Hence, we look for behavioural interventions that make subjects opt for longer 
investment horizons or lower feedback frequency in order to avoid the negative effects 
of MLA on investment levels. It turns out that setting a long investment horizon or 
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longer feedback intervals as a default is a successful intervention that increases 
investment levels significantly. Hence, exploiting the status quo bias can attenuate, if 
not fully cure, the effects of MLA. 
The analysis of MLA by the use of controlled experiments has been initiated by 
two independent papers of Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman and Schwartz (1997) and 
Gneezy and Potters (1997). Thaler et al. (1997) conducted an experiment where subjects 
could invest in two funds with positive expected returns, a low risk and return fund 
corresponding to a real five-year bond, and a high risk and return fund mimicking a 
stock-index fund. Subjects had to learn about risk and return distributions with 
experience. When providing feedback, investment returns were aggregated to reflect 
either a monthly, yearly or five-yearly horizon, depending on the treatment. Results 
showed that investments in the more risky fund were highest in the five-yearly 
condition followed by the yearly condition. The aggregation of short-term outcomes 
apparently was sufficient to reduce the frequency of experiencing losses and thus to 
increase investment levels. 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) demonstrated the same effect in an experiment where 
participants could invest in a risky lottery where with probability two thirds the invested 
amount was lost, but with probability one third a subject won 2.5 times the amount 
invested. In the “high” treatment, subjects could decide on the invested amount in each 
single round (out of 12 rounds in total) and received feedback about the return after 
each round. In the “low” treatment, subjects could change their investment amount only 
every third round and also received a cumulative feedback for three rounds, so that 
gains or losses could not be attributed to a particular round. In the “low” treatment, 
subjects invested significantly more in the risky lottery than in the “high” treatment, 
demonstrating that a longer evaluation period renders a risky option with positive 
expected return more attractive. This finding has been replicated in several other 
experiments, like in the context of an asset market (Gneezy, Kapteyn and Potters, 
2003), in a repeated choice task with minimal information (Barron and Erev, 2003), 
with groups and individuals as decision makers (Sutter, 2007), and it has been 
confirmed to exist to an even greater extent in professional traders (Haigh and List, 
2005). 
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In most of the previous experiments it was argued that less frequent feedback 
makes risky investments more attractive, when in fact yet another variable was varied 
simultaneously: the investment horizon or, in other words, the flexibility of changing 
one’s investment. Individuals learned about joint returns over a specific period of time 
and also had to commit their investment for that particular time span. Thus, myopic loss 
aversion might not only crucially depend on feedback frequency but also on the 
investment horizon. To assess whether both factors, or only a single one, trigger the 
effects of MLA is the first purpose of our paper. After having run the first experiment 
presented below we found out that there are two studies that have also addressed this 
question. Whereas Bellemare, Krause, Kröger and Zhang (2005) argue that the 
frequency of feedback determines the effects of MLA, Langer and Weber (forthcoming) 
identify the investment flexibility as the relevant factor. Our results will suggest that 
both factors are more or less equally important and that MLA has a robust impact on 
investment behaviour. 
The second – and main – purpose of this paper will then be to examine behavioural 
interventions that might curtail, if not cure, the effects of MLA. Such an endeavour has 
not been undertaken so far in the context of MLA and its effects on investments. To 
design a behavioural intervention that restrains the effects of MLA, it is, first of all, 
necessary to investigate individuals’ preferences for high or low investment flexibility 
and more or less frequent feedback. On aggregate, we find a slight preference for more 
investment flexibility over less, and subjects strongly prefer more frequent feedback 
over less frequent one. In order to possibly influence the endogenous choice of 
investment flexibility and feedback frequency we set up another experimental condition 
where subjects were informed about the average payoff previously achieved by subjects 
with either high or low flexibility or high or low feedback frequency. Yet, this 
additional information does not induce subjects to switch to the more rewarding regime 
(i.e. low flexibility or low feedback frequency). Finally, exposing subjects to a default 
setting seems to resolve the problem: although free to switch between high and low 
flexibility or feedback frequency at small costs, most individuals stick to the status quo 
that they experience initially. This result implies that decision inertia can be used to 
guide behaviour to achieve more desirable outcomes. Remarkably though, individuals 
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rather switch from low to high flexibility than vice versa, indicating a slight discomfort 
with less investment flexibility. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the 
basic experimental design. Section 3 is devoted to our first research question on the 
relative importance of investment flexibility and feedback frequency for the effects of 
MLA. Sections 4 and 5 present the treatments addressing our second research question, 
namely how to design behavioural interventions that make subjects choose a longer 
investment horizon or less frequent feedback. Section 6 reports a comprehensive 
econometric estimation of the determinants of investment levels in all treatments. 
Besides considering the influence of investment flexibility, the econometric model 
captures the influence of past behaviour and past realizations of investments. The latter 
aspects have not been taken into account in previous papers on MLA, and therefore add 
further insights into the determinants of investment behaviour. Section 7 concludes the 
paper with a brief summary and discussion. 
 
2. Basic experimental setup 
All experimental treatments are variations of the basic investment task of Gneezy 
and Potters (1997). Subjects are endowed with 100 ECU (experimental currency units, 
with 100 ECU = 50 Euro-Cents) in each of a total of 18 rounds. They can decide to 
keep the endowment with zero interest or invest any amount X ∈ [0, 100] in a risky 
lottery. If the lottery wins (with probability ⅓), subjects win 2.5 times the amount 
invested (in addition to keeping their initial endowment). If the lottery loses (with 
probability ⅔), the amount invested is lost. Therefore, the profit πi,t of an individual i 
that invests the amount Xi,t in round t is given by: 
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In total, 444 subjects from Jena University were recruited to participate in a series 
of three experimental studies which are presented below. Subjects were invited for 
participation by using the recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), and the sessions 
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were run computerized using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Each of the 
treatments was conducted in a separate session, and no subject could participate in more 
than one session. The average session length was 40 minutes. Participants earned on 
average 12.4 €, including a show up fee of 2.5 € (SD= 2.7 €). The instructions for all 
treatments are available from the authors upon request. 
 
3. The influence of investment flexibility and feedback frequency (Experiment 1) 
3.1 Experimental design 
To analyze the impact of investment flexibility and information feedback on risky 
investments, we employ a 2-by-2 design where both investment horizon and feedback 
frequency are varied in two distinct levels. 
The investment horizon to which participants have to commit is either one (H1) or 
three periods (H3). In condition H1, subjects can decide on the risky investment (Xi,t) in 
each single round and therefore have high flexibility in changing their investments. 
With a three-period horizon (H3), subjects must decide every third round about the level 
of investment in the next three rounds, subject to the restriction that the particular 
investment level has to be identical in all three rounds. In this case, flexibility is low. 
The feedback on the investment is either given after each single period (F1) or 
provided in aggregated form for a respective sequence of three periods (F3). In the 
former case feedback frequency is high (F1), in the latter case it is low (F3). 
The combination of both factors allows fully identifying the relative importance of 
investment flexibility and feedback frequency for the level of investments in risky 
lotteries. The two treatments H1F1 (high flexibility and high feedback frequency) and 
H3F3 (low flexibility and low feedback frequency) correspond to the classical design by 
Gneezy and Potters (1997), where feedback frequency and investment horizon were 
varied simultaneously. The additional treatments H1F3 (high flexibility and low 
feedback frequency) and H3F1 (low flexibility and high feedback frequency) enable us 
to disentangle the effects of feedback frequency and investment flexibility when 
comparing either of them to H1F1. If it is solely frequent feedback that causes MLA, 
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more or less investment flexibility should not matter and therefore no difference in risky 
investments is expected between conditions H1F1 and H3F1 or between H1F3 and 
H3F3. Yet, if high investment flexibility leads to myopic loss aversion, we expect no 
difference in investment levels between H1F1 and H1F3 or between H3F1 and H3F3. 
In total, 118 subjects participated in the four treatments of this experiment. We call 
the treatments Exogenous, because both the investment horizon and the feedback 
frequency were exogenously imposed on subjects by the experimenter. In each of the 
three treatments H1F1, H3F1, and H3F3 we had 30 subjects, and in treatment H1F3 we 
had 28 subjects. 
 
3.2 Results in the Exogenous treatments 
Figure 1 displays the average investments in the risky lottery across rounds. The 
overall averages are 33.3 in H1F1, 52.6 in H1F3, 64.8 in H3F1, and 56.6 in H3F3. 
Investment levels in H1F1 are significantly smaller than in any of the three other 
treatments (p < 0.01; two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test1). This is an indication that both 
feedback frequency and investment horizon have an influence on myopic loss aversion.2 
Investments increase if either the investment horizon is long (H3) or the feedback 
frequency is low (F3). It is interesting to note, though, that there is no cumulative effect 
of investment horizon and feedback frequency: the average investment in H3F3 is 56.6, 
which is significantly higher than in H1F1 (as already established by Gneezy and 
Potters, 1997). However, investments in H3F3 are not higher than in H1F3 or in H3F1 
(p > 0.2 in any comparison; Mann-Whitney U-tests). 
 
                                                 
1 All tests reported below are two-sided. 
2 We discuss this finding and its relation to the papers of Bellemare et al. (2005) and Langer and Weber 
(forthcoming) in more detail in the final section of this paper. 
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Figure 1: Exogenous treatments 
 
4. Behavioural intervention I: Endogenous choice (Experiment 2) 
Experiment 1 has found that both feedback frequency and investment flexibility 
cause the effects of MLA. In Experiment 2 we want to find out subjects’ preferences for 
(high or low) investment flexibility and (high or low) feedback frequency on their 
investments. Given that all previous experimental studies on MLA have determined 
both feedback frequency and investment horizon exogenously, no evidence is available 
yet on subjects’ preferences with respect to both aspects. If subjects were found out to 
prefer low investment flexibility or low feedback frequency, MLA could be regarded as 
a minor issue in practice since subjects would then invest under conditions which run 
counter to the effects of MLA. In such a situation no policy intervention would be 
necessary. If subjects preferred high flexibility and frequent feedback, policy 
interventions to ameliorate the effects of MLA might be important, though. Experiment 
2 is designed to shed light on subjects’ preferences by a series of what we call Endo 
treatments. To keep control as tight as possible we let subjects in the different 
treatments choose only one aspect of the investment conditions, either the investment 
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flexibility (section 4.1) or the feedback frequency (section 4.2), holding the other aspect 
constant. 
 
4.1 Preferences for investment flexibility (Endo-horizon treatments) 
4.1.1 Experimental design 
Subjects can choose their preferred investment horizon (H1 or H3) before the first 
round. No switching is possible between the long and short horizon throughout the 18 
rounds. Feedback frequency is high (F1) and fixed, meaning that subjects are informed 
on their investment return after every round. 
There are two conditions in this treatment. In the No-Profit condition, the game is 
explained to subjects and afterwards the investment horizon can be chosen. In the Profit 
condition, subjects are additionally informed about the average profits for the two 
different horizons achieved by subjects in the Exogenous treatment (with 9.3€ in H1F1, 
and 10.1€ in H3F1, excluding the show-up fee). The Profit condition is chosen in order 
to check whether linking the choice of the investment horizon with information on 
average profits with each horizon has an effect on subjects’ choices. In total, 53 subjects 
participated in the No-Profit condition and 28 subjects in the Profit condition. 
 
4.1.2 Results in the Endo-horizon treatments 
In the No-Profit condition, 32 subjects (60.4%) chose the short horizon (H1) and 
21 subjects (39.6%) the long one (H3). The distribution of choices is not significantly 
different from a random choice (Binomial test), indicating that no clear cut preference 
for either horizon exists on an aggregate level. Figure 2 shows the average investments 
across rounds. Subjects with a long horizon invest more than subjects with a short 
horizon, however not significantly so (53.8 in H3 vs. 46.2 H1; p > 0.2; Mann-Whitney 
U-Test). 
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Figure 2: Treatment Endo-horizon – No-Profit condition 
 
In the Profit condition, each investment horizon was chosen by exactly 14 subjects, 
confirming that there is no clear-cut preference for either horizon in the aggregate. 
Figure 3 indicates that the longer horizon (H3) triggers significantly higher investments 
(75.6 vs. 33.4; p < 0.01; Mann-Whitney U-Test). 
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Figure 3: Treatment Endo-horizon – Profit Condition 
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Though the frequency of choosing the long horizon is somewhat higher in the 
Profit condition (50%) than in the No-Profit condition (39.6%), the difference is 
insignificant (χ²-test). This means that adding information about higher profits with a 
longer horizon is an inadequate intervention to make subjects choose the longer 
investment horizon significantly more often. 
 
4.2 Preferences for feedback frequency (Endo-frequency treatments) 
4.2.1 Experimental design 
Here, subjects can choose before the first round whether they like to receive 
feedback on their investments every round (F1) or every third round in aggregate form 
(F3). No further switching is possible throughout the 18 rounds. Subjects can decide on 
the invested amount in every round, meaning that the investment horizon is short (H1), 
and thus investment flexibility high. 
Again, there are two conditions: In the No-Profit condition, only the game is 
explained before subjects choose the feedback frequency. In the Profit condition 
subjects are additionally informed about the average profits for the different feedback 
frequencies achieved by subjects in the analogous Exogenous treatment (with 9.4€ in 
H1F1, and 9.6€ in H1F3, excluding the show-up fee). In total, 32 subjects participated 
in the No-Profit condition and 31 subjects in the Profit condition. 
 
4.2.2 Results in the Endo-frequency treatment 
Twenty eight out of 32 subjects chose the high frequency (F1) in the No-Profit 
condition, and only four the low frequency (F3). This is significantly different from a 
random choice (p < 0.01, Binomial test), demonstrating a clear preference for frequent 
feedback. However, Figure 4 shows that subjects with the lower feedback frequency 
choose significantly higher investments (65.0 vs. 39.8; p < 0.05; Mann-Whitney U-test). 
 
  11
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 13-15 16-18
Rounds
A
ve
ra
ge
 ri
sk
y 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
F1
F3
 
Figure 4: Treatment Endo-frequency – No Profit Condition 
 
In the Profit condition, 20 out of 31 subjects chose F1 and eleven F3. The choice 
distribution is significantly different from a random one (p < 0.05; Binomial test), 
confirming an aggregate preference for frequent feedback. Subjects with a lower 
feedback frequency invest more on average (see Figure 5), but the difference is not 
significant (50.0 vs. 34.0; p = 0.15; Mann-Whitney U-test). Comparing the choice 
distribution across conditions, we find that in the Profit condition subjects choose 
significantly more often the low feedback frequency than in the No-Profit condition 
(35.5% of subjects vs. 12.5%; p < 0.05; χ²-test). 
The bottom line of our Experiment 2 is the finding that, on average, individuals 
slightly prefer more investment flexibility (H1) over less (H3) and clearly more frequent 
feedback (F1) over less (F3). Hence, the preferred conditions are those in which 
subjects make less (profitable) investments and less profit, as has been documented in 
Experiment 1. Informing subjects about the prospect of higher profits in the more 
favourable condition (less flexibility or less feedback) led to mixed evidence: Giving 
information about profits did not induce subjects to commit to a longer investment 
horizon, but it did induce them to choose less frequent feedback, although the relative 
frequency of subjects preferring the less frequent feedback was still only around one 
third. So what can be done to induce subjects to make investments with a long horizon 
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(H3) or a low frequency of feedback (F3)? Experiment 3 intends to answer this 
question. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 13-15 16-18
Rounds
A
ve
ra
ge
 ri
sk
y 
in
ve
st
m
en
t
F1
F3
 
Figure 5: Treatment Endo-frequency – Profit Condition 
5. Behavioural intervention II: Providing a default (Experiment 3) 
5.1 Setting a default investment horizon (Default-horizon treatments) 
5.1.1 Experimental design 
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are assigned by default to either a 
short or a long investment horizon, i.e. to condition H1 or H3. Feedback is always given 
after every round (F1). After having played the first three rounds in the default 
condition, subjects are offered the chance to switch from the short to the long horizon or 
vice versa. Switching is possible every third round3 at a small cost of 40 ECU.4 The 
Default-horizon treatments thus offer subjects complete autarky over their horizon 
                                                 
3 The restriction to switch only every third round was chosen in order to keep investment decisions in H1 
and H3 comparable. 
4 If someone switches after the third round, the switching costs amount to about 2.6% of his total sum of 
endowments in rounds 4-18. Of course, switching becomes relatively more expensive in later rounds (in 
relation to one’s endowment in the remaining rounds), but if a subject has a clear preference for the 
alternative horizon – instead of the default horizon – she should anyhow switch immediately right after 
round 3. 
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(every third round), but simply exposes subjects to a default condition at the beginning. 
In total, we had 118 participants in Default-horizon, of which 60 were initially assigned 
to the short horizon (H1) and 58 to the long horizon (H3). 
 
5.1.2 Results in the Default-horizon treatments 
Figure 6 displays the cumulative number of subjects switching to the alternative 
condition (from H1 to H3 and vice versa) for every block of three rounds. At most four 
out of the 60 subjects (6.7%) switch from a short (H1) to a long investment horizon 
(H3). Switching is more frequent with the long default horizon, though. By round 7, a 
total of 12 subjects have switched from H3 to H1 and by round 16 this number increases 
to 15 out of 58 participants (26%). The difference in switching frequencies between the 
two default conditions is significant (p < 0.01; χ²-test). This finding indicates that 
individuals are more eager to switch to higher investment flexibility (in H1) than to 
lower (in H3). 
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Figure 6: Treatment Default-horizon – Cumulative number of subjects opting for 
alternative horizon 
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However, even though subjects switch more often from the long horizon to the 
short horizon, Figure 6 also shows that at least 74% (43 out of 58) of subjects stick to 
the long horizon H3 when exposed to it by default. This frequency of voluntarily 
restricting one’s own flexibility is significantly larger than in treatment Endo-horizon, 
compared both to the No-Profit condition and to the Profit condition (p < 0.05 in any 
case; χ²-tests). Hence, the behavioural intervention of setting a default is successful in 
keeping much more subjects with the long investment horizon, i.e. the low investment 
flexibility. 
Figure 7 shows investment patterns in the Default-horizon treatments. Subjects 
with the short horizon (H1) invest less than subjects with the long horizon (H3) (56.4 
vs. 45.9; p < 0.05; Mann-Whitney U-test). 
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Figure 7: Treatment Default-horizon 
 
The opportunity of switching investment horizons allows for a within-subjects test 
of how the horizon affects investments. Since only four subjects out of 60 switched 
from the short horizon-default (H1) to the long horizon (H3), we cannot reasonably test 
for within-subjects differences. Yet, in the H3-default we have a total of 17 subjects 
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who experienced both H1 and H3 by at least switching once from H3 to H1.5 We find 
no differences in investment levels within these 17 subjects between H1 and H3 (with 
average investments of 51.5 in H1 versus 53.4 in H3; p > 0.2; Wilcoxon signed ranks 
test). Hence, it seems that the initially experienced long horizon induces rather high 
investment levels that are not significantly reduced when subjects switch to a short 
horizon. We have also investigated whether subjects who switched from the H3-default 
to H1 show different investment levels than those who did not switch. This is not the 
case, though. 
 
5.2 Setting a default feedback frequency (Default-frequency treatments) 
5.2.1 Experimental design 
Subjects are assigned by default to either a high (F1) or a low feedback frequency 
(F3) at the beginning. The investment horizon is always short (H1). After every third 
round subjects are given the possibility to switch from the high to the low feedback 
frequency or vice versa at fixed costs of 40 ECU. The Default-frequency treatments 
assign subjects full discretionary power over the feedback frequency on their 
investments, but expose them initially to a default condition. 64 subjects participated in 
Default-frequency; half of them were initially assigned to a high frequency (F1) and the 
other half to a low frequency (F3) as default. 
 
5.2.2 Results in the Default-frequency treatments 
Figure 8 shows the cumulative number of subjects that decided to abandon the 
default feedback frequency in favour of the alternative one. The dark bars represent the 
number of subjects switching from F1 to F3 and the light bars represent subjects 
switching from F3 to F1. Nearly everyone (96.8%) stays with high feedback frequency 
F1. Yet, the remarkable finding is that also more than two thirds (68.75%) of subjects 
                                                 
5 A probit regression of the determinants of switching from the default horizon to the alternative one 
shows that the likelihood of switching is about 4.5% higher when the default is the long horizon (H3) 
rather than the short one (H1). Furthermore, we find that the more often a subject won in previous 
rounds, the less likely becomes switching (by about 0.8% per win). Detailed results are available upon 
request. 
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remain in the low feedback frequency (F3) when this is their default. This frequency is 
significantly larger than the fraction of subjects choosing F3 in the Endo-frequency 
treatments (p < 0.01; χ²-tests). Figure 9 shows that subjects with the low-frequency 
default invest on average more than those with the high-frequency default, though the 
difference is weakly significant (p = 0.09, Mann-Whitney U-Test). 
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Figure 8: Treatment Default-frequency – Cumulative number of subjects opting for 
alternative frequency 
 
As some of the subjects experience both feedback frequencies we can explore the 
within-subjects sensitivity to different feedback conditions. Only one subject out of 32 
switched from the F1-default to F3, thus no reasonable test can be employed. However, 
in the F3-default, 11 of the 32 subjects experienced both F1 and F3 by switching at least 
once from F3 to F1.6 Their average investments do not differ across feedback conditions 
(42.6 in F1 vs. 40.8 in F3 ; p > 0.2; Wilcoxon signed ranks test), which is a similar 
result as the one found for subjects switching in the Default-horizon treatments. 
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Figure 9: Treatment Default-frequency 
 
6. The determinants of behaviour over time and across treatments 
Somewhat surprisingly, all previous experimental studies on MLA did not take the 
time pattern of investment behaviour into account, most probably because their main 
focus was to examine the aggregate effects of MLA. Yet, an analysis of investment 
behaviour over time may yield further insights into the determinants of investments. 
Hence, we estimate a Tobit panel regression model where the dependent variable is the 
invested amount, aggregated over three rounds.7 The main independent variables are 
Investment horizon (0 = H1, 1 = H3) and Feedback frequency (0 = F1, 1 = F3). Several 
additional variables (see Table 1) reflect the experience throughout the course of the 
experiment and allow examining how subjects react to past investment returns. 
Accumulated wealth measures the sum of earnings up to the recent sequence of three 
rounds. Number of all previous wins ranges from 0 to a maximum of 9 in the data, 
Number of wins in previous three rounds indicates the most recent experiences of 
                                                                                                                                               
6 A probit regression reveals that switching is more likely (by about 3.3%) in the F3-default and that 
switching becomes less likely with more wins in previous rounds (by about 0.6% per win). 
7 The aggregation is necessary since investment levels do not change for three rounds whenever the 
investment horizon is long (i.e. in condition H3). 
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winning and ranges from 0 to 3. Finally, several dummy variables for the different 
treatments and conditions are included. Choice (0 = exogenous conditions, 1 = 
endogenous conditions including default treatments) allows to examine whether freely 
choosing the basic investment setting has an influence on investment levels (controlling 
for the investment horizon and feedback intervals). Additional dummies are Profit 
condition (equals 1 in the Endo-treatments if average profits were revealed before the 
experiment) and Default condition (equals 1 whenever subjects were provided with a 
default horizon or feedback interval that could be changed subsequently). 
Table 1 reports three different model specifications,8 starting on the left-hand side 
with a full model, including interaction effects of Choice and the different parameters 
capturing experience. The positive regression coefficient for both investment horizon 
and the feedback frequency confirms that the effect of MLA is caused by both. 
However, the effects are not cumulative as indicated by the significantly negative 
interaction effect (Horizon * Frequency). On the contrary, investments are most 
positively affected if either the investment horizon is long (at short feedback intervals) 
or the feedback intervals are long (at short horizons).  
Findings with respect to experience over the course of the experiment reveal that 
individuals invest less after repeated gains in the past three rounds, or vice versa, invest 
more after repeated losses in the past three rounds, which is in accordance to the 
hypothesis of loss recovery (Staw, 1976). This finding is also an indication for myopia 
as subjects react strongest to very recent gains and losses, but do not react significantly 
to the accumulated number of gains throughout the whole experiment or the 
accumulated wealth. 
The variable Choice reveals some remarkable implications. First, investments are 
higher with endogenous choice. Hence, subjects invest generally more with a higher 
degree of freedom in the investment setting. Second, several interaction effects of 
Choice and other variables show fundamental differences between the exogenous and 
endogenous treatments. As a consequence, Table 1 also includes separate Tobit 
                                                 
8 The significant mean value of random errors due to unobserved individual heterogeneity ( uσ ) and the 
relatively high proportion of the error term in total residuals due to individual heterogeneity ( ρ ) both 
confirm the need of using a random effects model. 
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regressions for the exogenous and the endogenous treatments, thereby illustrating the 
nature of the interaction effects in the full model. 
The first fact to catch one’s eye from comparing the Exogenous with the 
Endogenous model is that both the coefficients of the investment horizon and the 
feedback frequency are considerably smaller in the endogenous treatments. Endogenous 
choice seems to reduce the negative impact of MLA on investments, but still does not 
eliminate it. 
The second noteworthy finding is that in the Endogenous treatments subjects react 
differently to gains within the past three rounds and gains throughout all previous 
rounds. Subjects invest less the higher the number of very recent wins, but they invest 
more the more wins they experienced throughout all previous rounds, which is 
reminiscent of the house money effect (Thaler and Johnson, 1990). Moreover, it seems 
that in the presence of endogenous choice subjects are more sensitive to experiences 
and by reacting not only to recent gains and losses exhibit less myopia. 
Finally, in the Exogenous treatment as well as in the full model, the coefficient for 
horizon is significantly larger than for feedback frequency (Wald-test, p < 0.01), 
suggesting that the investment horizon has a relatively stronger impact on investments 
than the feedback frequency. In the Endogenous treatments, the significant difference 
between the coefficients of investment horizon and feedback frequency vanishes (Wald-
test, p > 0.2), albeit both factors still affect investments significantly. 
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Table 1: Tobit panel regression on lottery investment 
Dependent Variable:  Full Model  Exogenous  Endogenous  
Investment [ ]100,0∈tiX   coef. Se  coef. se  coef. se  
Constant  31.278** 3.320  31.414** 2.905  45.2760** 1.965  
Investment horizon 
(0 = H1, 1 = H3) 
 
35.333** 3.350  35.112** 3.058  14.119** 1.751  
Feedback frequency 
(0=F1, 1=F3) 
 
21.800** 3.359  21.556** 3.045  12.512** 2.360  
Horizon * Frequency   -30.826** 4.749  -30.638** 4.423  ―  
Accumulated wealth  0.003 0.005  0.002 0.004  -0.005 0.003  
Number of all previous wins  1.412 1.398  1.440 1.168  4.170** 1.058  
Number of wins in previous 
 three rounds 
 
-4.992** 1.432  -4.984** 1.361  -8.532** 0.964  
Choice  13.996** 3.850  ―  ―  
 Profit conditions  -1.805 2.211  ―  -1.841 2.252  
Default conditions  0.645 1.755  ―  0.670 1.782  
Choice * Horizon  -21.282** 3.770  ―  ―  
Choice * Frequency  -9.291* 4.077  ―  ―  
Choice * Accumulated Wealth  -0.008 0.006  ―  ―  
Choice * Number of all 
 previous wins 
 2.770 1.748  ―  ―  
Choice * Number of wins in 
previous three rounds 
 
-3.524* 1.717  ―  ―  
2
uσ   34.127** 1.044  33.971** 1.813  34.328** 1.259  
2
iσ   20.763** 0.384  19.793** 0.689  21.109** 0.460  
ρ   .730  .747  .726  
log likelihood  -8424.228  -2230.710  -6192.531  
# of subjects  444  118  326  
# of observations  2220  590  1630  
# uncensored  
# left censored/ 
# right censored 
 1619 
159 
442 
 
437 
27 
126 
 
1182  
132 
316 
 
Significance levels: *  p ≤ 0.05 ** p ≤ 0.01 
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7. Summary and discussion 
Since the seminal paper of Benartzi and Thaler (1995) myopic loss aversion has 
been identified as one explanation why investors might invest less in risky assets when 
returns are frequently evaluated and the length of the investment horizon is rather short. 
In this paper, we have tried to disentangle the causes of myopic loss aversion and to put 
forward possible cures for it. 
Whereas most previous papers have stressed the role of feedback frequency for 
MLA, attempts to disentangle the relative importance of feedback frequency and the 
investment horizon have only been undertaken recently – and independently from each 
other. In addition to feedback frequency, we have identified the length of commitment 
to a given investment as a crucial factor for the level of risky investments. With lower 
investment flexibility – and, thus, longer investment horizons – subjects invest more in 
a risky lottery, even if they receive frequent feedback on gains and losses. The latter 
result has also been found by Langer and Weber (forthcoming). Bellemare et al. (2005), 
however, have claimed that feedback frequency, but not the investment horizon, is 
responsible for MLA. Yet, it has to be noted that Bellemare et al. (2005) have only 
investigated the three conditions that have been denoted in our Experiment 1 as H1F1, 
H3F3, and H1F3. They lack the fourth treatment, H3F1, though, and therefore have not 
been able to examine whether a longer investment horizon by itself (in spite of frequent 
feedback) may yield higher investments. In fact, our Experiment 1 has shown that it 
does. The common denominator of Langer and Weber (forthcoming), Bellemare et al. 
(2005) and our study is therefore the finding that a manipulation of feedback frequency 
and/or investment flexibility leads to different investment levels. Given the consensus 
on this fact, it seems a natural next step to search for behavioural interventions to 
attenuate the effects of MLA. This has been the second focus – and main novelty – of 
our paper. 
Giving subjects an option to choose the investment horizon or the feedback 
frequency (in Experiment 2), we have found that the majority of subjects prefer high 
feedback frequency and short investment horizons. Even adding the information that 
lower feedback frequency and longer investment horizons lead on average to higher 
profits does not cause a strong shift of preferences towards longer horizons and less 
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feedback.9 Hence, subjects still prefer on aggregate those investment conditions (with 
respect to the investment horizon and the feedback frequency) that cause the effects of 
MLA. These findings indicate that fighting myopia is not a trivial task. 
Experiment 3 has therefore further examined how to avoid subjects opting into 
investment conditions that support MLA. Setting a default – be it a long investment 
horizon or low feedback frequency – with a switching option has been found to be a 
successful behavioural intervention: It makes about 75% of subjects stay with the long 
horizon and at least 66% of subjects stay with low feedback frequency. Exploiting the 
status-quo bias thus seems to be a promising avenue to fight myopic loss aversion as 
subjects who face a long investment horizon or low feedback frequency invest more in 
the risky lottery. This result is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that the 
effects of MLA also prevail when subjects have discretionary power over the 
investment setting. Thus, the influence of MLA is not restricted to settings where the 
horizon or the feedback frequency is exogenously determined by the experimenter, as 
has been the case in all previous studies. Second, the behavioural trait of MLA can 
actually be exploited by setting the long horizon or low feedback frequency as a default, 
thereby inducing higher investments (with higher expected returns). The latter result is 
remarkably similar to the effects of setting a default in 401(k) plan enrolment in U.S. 
companies (see Benartzi and Thaler, 2004; Mitchell and Utkus, 2006). As Choi et al. 
(2001, 2003), for instance, have shown, enrolment in retirement savings plans is much 
higher (sometimes by a factor of four) when new employees are enrolled by default in 
the savings plan and have to opt out (by making a phone call to the personnel office) 
than when they have to opt in (also by simply making a call). In our experiment, we 
have found that at most one third of subjects opt out from the long investment horizon 
or the low feedback frequency, which is close to the opting-out rate reported in Choi et 
al. (2001, 2003). Gneezy et al. (2003) report an interesting case where an Israeli 
commercial bank has tried to make use of investors’ status quo bias. The Israeli bank 
has reduced the frequency with which it informs its customers about their stocks’ 
                                                 
9 An implication of this finding is that subjects are willing to forego possibly higher profits in order to 
keep high flexibility in changing their investments (i.e. having a short investment horizon) or to receive 
frequent feedback on the performance of their investments. Whereas we have only indirect evidence for 
this implication, a paper by Charness and Gneezy (2003) finds that subjects are, indeed, willing to pay 
money to receive frequent feedback on their investments’ performance. 
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returns in order to avoid that they experience losses in short intervals. Obviously, the 
bank has tried to set a low feedback frequency-default in order to avoid the effects of 
MLA. Presumably, the main motivation for this institutional change of investment 
conditions was to induce an increase in investment levels. Unfortunately, in contrast to 
Choi et al. (2001, 2003), there are no data on how the bank’s behavioural intervention 
has actually worked out. However, our data suggest it should have had an impact on the 
customers’ investment levels. 
Contrary to all previous experimental studies on MLA, we have also examined the 
development of investment patterns over time. The panel data analysis has confirmed 
that both feedback frequency and investment horizon have an influence on investment 
levels. On top of this, the analysis has provided further insights into how the exogenous 
or endogenous determination of investment conditions (concerning horizon and 
feedback) affects investment behaviour. Though MLA prevails both with endogenous 
choice and exogenous determination of investment conditions, a closer examination of 
the time pattern of investments has revealed different reactions to experienced gains and 
losses between the exogenous and endogenous treatments. Subjects in the endogenous 
treatments react positively to the total number of previous wins, but negatively to wins 
in the most recent three rounds. This suggests a belief in some kind of (short term) trend 
reversion, also known as gambler’s fallacy (Clotfelter and Cook, 1993). If the number 
of wins in the past three rounds was high, one may expect it to be lower in the next 
three rounds and therefore reduce the investments. If, however, in the longer term the 
number of previous wins was high (and therefore potentially also accumulated earnings) 
one may decide to risk more money, which is in line with the house money effect 
(Thaler and Johnson, 1990). In sum, it seems that subjects who are given degrees of 
freedom in choosing the basic investment conditions are more actively managing their 
investments, as they react more intensively to past experience concerning gains and 
losses, whereas subjects with an exogenous assignment of the investment horizon or 
feedback frequency seem more passive and unaffected by past experience. 
An additional difference between the endogenous and exogenous determination of 
investment conditions has been found with respect to the magnitude of myopic loss 
aversion. When subjects have autonomy over investment horizon or feedback frequency 
(in Experiments 2 and 3), the effect of MLA is, on average, less pronounced than when 
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subjects have no autonomy (in Experiment 1). This implies that all previous 
experiments with exogenous assignments may have measured an upper limit of the 
effects of MLA, since in the real world investors can be considered to have a high 
degree of autonomy in determining their investment flexibility and the frequency of 
monitoring their investments. It is important to stress, though, that even with full 
autonomy our results suggest that MLA prevails. As a consequence, behavioural 
interventions, like setting a longer investment horizon or a low feedback frequency by 
default are an appropriate tool to contain, if not fully cure, the effects of MLA. 
Investment companies or commercial banks – like the Israeli bank referred to in Gneezy 
et al. (2003) – seem obvious candidates to apply such behavioural interventions with 
their customers in order to keep investments high. But also (stock) market designers 
might want to consider the effects of status quo biases – as those shown in this paper – 
on investment behaviour. Small changes in transactions costs that make, e.g., short-term 
investments more costly and thus longer-term investment horizons more attractive 
might have strong effects on investment levels. It seems an interesting avenue for future 
research, thus, to examine how institutional changes on real-world markets that affect 
the frequency of feedback on investment returns or the length of commitment to a 
specific investment influence the aggregate level of investments. 
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